The role of independent directors in the regulated firms: an empirical analysis by Becagli, Claudio et al.
 1 
The role of independent directors in the regulated firms: an empirical analysis 
 
Claudio Becagli∗ 
Sara De Masi∗∗ 
Andrea Paci∗∗∗ 
 
Working paper: August 2010 
 
Abstract 
The introduction of corporate governance codes in Europe has stressed on the 
importance of boards of directors dominated by independent directors. Many commentators 
and institutional investors believe that independent directors are particularly effective in 
controlling CEO’s actions, pushing him to take decisions to improve firm performance, 
growth and dividend policy. We conduct a study of whether independent directors and 
other board variables correlate with the performance, the growth and the dividend policy of 
European public utilities. We find evidence that independent directors reduce future firm 
performance and that they do not affect neither firm growth nor dividend policy. Using 
different econometric techniques and controlling for endogeneity, our results do not 
support the conventional wisdom of corporate governance codes that greater board 
independence improves firm results. 
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